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Although most aspects of world and self-consciousness are inherently subjective,
neuroscience studies in humans and non-human animals provide correlational and
causative indices of specific links between brain activity and representation of the
self and the world. In this article we review neuroanatomic, neurophysiological and
neuropsychological data supporting the hypothesis that different levels of self and
world representation in vertebrates rely upon (i) a “basal” subcortical system that
includes brainstem, hypothalamus and central thalamic nuclei and that may underpin
the primary (or anoetic) consciousness likely present in all vertebrates; and (ii)
a forebrain system that include the medial and lateral structures of the cerebral
hemispheres and may sustain the most sophisticated forms of consciousness [e.g.,
noetic (knowledge based) and autonoetic, reflective knowledge]. We posit a mutual,
bidirectional functional influence between these two major brain circuits. We conclude
that basic aspects of consciousness like primary self and core self (based on anoetic
and noetic consciousness) are present in many species of vertebrates and that, even
self-consciousness (autonoetic consciousness) does not seem to be a prerogative of
humans and of some non-human primates but may, to a certain extent, be present in
some other mammals and birds
Keywords: nervous system evolution, vertebrate brain, self and world awareness, mental time traveling, theory of
mind
Look in the mirror, and don’t be tempted to equate transient domination with either intrinsic superiority
or prospects for extended survival.
Stephen Jay (Gould, 2011)
Introduction
Under physiological conditions the experience of returning from the inner world (as in dreams)
to the outer world as a reflectively conscious, sentient being, with self-awareness, occurs very
often (e.g., every time one wakes up). However, understanding the link between consciousness and
representation of the self existentially in both social and non-social worlds, is a challenging enter-
prise for both psychology and neuroscience. Consciousness can be considered as the appearance
of a world during both waking or dreaming states (Edelman, 2004; Revonsuo, 2006, 2010,
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Metzinger, 2009). It is often divided into primary (anoetic) con-
sciousness mainly related to perception-, affect-, and action-
related representations; and in higher- order consciousness
linked to interpretation of the primary consciousness contents
(noetic) including self-related notions (autonoetic) of past and
future (Edelman, 1989; Seth et al., 2005; Kahneman, 2011).
In addition to the difficulties linked to the notion of con-
sciousness as a “hard problem,” i.e., why we have phenomenal
experiences (Chalmers, 1995), several other foundational issues
should be taken into account. The first is that any approach to
the scientific investigation of this question needs to integrate data
from first (subjective) and third-person (objective) perspectives.
The second has to do with the need to deal with philosophical
reflections, with abundant historical “baggage,” related to the dif-
ferent levels of analysis of the issues under investigation. The
third is the problem of making explicit the philosophical posi-
tions of scientific investigators of consciousness, since multiple
levels of brain-mind control need to be considered. Such levels
range from anoetic (experience without knowledge) and noetic
(experience with knowledge), to autonoetic consciousness which
consists of “time travel” where the minds eye can explore in a
self-centered perspective past experiences and future hopes and
aspirations (see Edelman, 2004).
Extending the analysis to the different classes of vertebrates is
evenmore challenging because, not only is difficult for humans to
understand or experience other human sentient beings, but it is
even more complex to imagine “what is it like to be a bat” (Nagel,
1974). Moreover, knowledge about the relationship between the
mind of animals and the anatomical and physiological organiza-
tion of their nervous system is meager. Taxonomically, a large
part of the phylum chordata is constituted by the subphylum
vertebrata that includes a variety of species (about 4% of all
described animal species) ranging from fish, amphibians, rep-
tiles and birds to mammals. All the different vertebrate species
are endowed with a common brain archetype divided into telen-
cephalon and diencephalon (collectively referred to as forebrain),
mesencephalon (midbrain) and rhombencephalon (hindbrain).
Given the widely held causal relation between brain and behav-
ior, an important question for psychology, neuroscience and even
philosophy is whether and to what extent all the different verte-
brate species share the mechanisms involved in the evolutionary
emergence of phenomenal experiences (including affective, inte-
roceptive, and exteroceptive varieties) to the much higher ability
to mentally represent the self as an actor in the world. In the fol-
lowing we examine this extant issue by starting from humans in
whom a variety of simple and complex forms of consciousness
exist.
Knowledge about the meaning of world and self-
representation deriving from phenomenological, neuropsy-
chological and neurophysiological approaches will be reviewed.
Since phenomenological (subjective) evidence can be obtained
only in humans (but only semi-directly through language), we
must tackle evolutionarily related issues in the other classes of
vertebrates (fishes, amphibians, reptiles, birds, and mammals)
by reviewing not only neuroanatomical, neuropsychological
and neurophysiological data. Moreover behavioral data hinting
at the presence of affective experiences will be discussed by
evaluating the rewarding and punishing properties, as inferred
from deep brain stimulation (DBS) of brain emotional circuits. It
is important to note that we do not intend to use the phylogenetic
taxonomy for establishing a sort of hierarchy among vertebrates
and we do not intend to attribute to, say, living reptiles a
higher or lower place with respect to mammals. We simply
mean that the different classes of vertebrates represent different
genealogical lines originating from a common origin and that
each class can be described by referring to the complexity of
their nervous system (Butler and Hodos, 1996; Denton, 2006),
and to functional homologies of the brain structures involved
in primary-process emotions (Panksepp, 1998a, 2011). In the
following, we discuss homologies, analogies and differences in
the way self and world representation manifest in the different
vertebrate species.
Consciousness in Human Beings
Neuroscience studies indicate that the human brain continu-
ously creates the conscious experience of being in the world
(i.e., “I am in this outside-me place, now”; Revonsuo, 2006,
2010; Metzinger, 2009). Consciousness emerges from the brain’s
ability to construct a complex representation of the world and
the self (Edelman, 2004). That both the self and the world
are constructed by the brain is strongly suggested by the pro-
found changes of self and world consciousness following cerebral
lesions and during dreaming, a condition where external inputs
are blocked (Frith, 2007). It is worth noting that lesions of specific
brain regions may bring about domain-specific deficits of aware-
ness. Lesions to different visual areas, for example, may induce
defects in the recognition the form (apperceptive agnosia) or
the movement of an object (akinetopsia, Zeki, 2009) and lesions
to higher-order cortical regions may induce defective awareness
of space (e.g., hemispatial neglect, Kourtzi and Connor, 2011).
Complex domain-specific deficits following frontal or occipito-
parietal regions such as anosoagnosia for hemiplegia (Moro et al.,
2011) or for visual deficits (Anton Babinsky’s syndrome) have
also been reported (Feinberg and Keenan, 2005). However, we
are not aware that our experience of the world and of the self
are brain constructions and that self and world represent models
through which information is processed. In philosophical par-
lance, the illusion that such models are the reality is called trans-
parency (Revonsuo, 2006; Metzinger, 2009). It is worth noting
that the brain’s construction of the world and self is not arbitrary
but it takes into account the operational interactions learned at
both phylogenetic and ontogenetic levels (Jerison, 1973; Striedter,
2005). More specifically, the world representations created by
the brain are highly adaptive and allow individuals to imple-
ment a number of effective operations like moving in the world,
maintaining bodily and affective homeostasis, developing plans
for self- fulfillment (Geary, 2007). Importantly, however, sev-
eral examples speak in favor of the inherent link between “real”
and “mentally” created worlds, or as it has been also called “the
objectively perceived reality” vs. “the subjectively conceived real-
ity” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Humphrey, 1992, 2011). Con-
scious awareness is a simulation per se and does not put the
subject in direct contact with reality. It is thus possible to think
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of mental experiments in which even an expert pilot unaware
to be in a very realistic flight simulator believes he is operat-
ing on a real airplane (Metzinger, 2009). Moreover, representa-
tions concerning the world and the self may often be contra-
dictory, as indicated by the fact that illusions may fool vision
but not action suggesting errors may occur in allocentric (i.e.,
world-based) visual coordinates but not in ego-centric (i.e., self-
based) motor coordinates. For example, people are susceptible
to the “Titchener circles” illusion in which the same target cir-
cle appears to be larger when is surrounded by a circular array
of smaller than larger circles. Crucially, the same participants
who are fooled by the illusion when making perceptual judg-
ments, when asked to pick up the central circle scale their grip
aperture on the basis of the true size of the target disc and
not of its illusory size (Aglioti et al., 1995). In a complemen-
tary vein, illusory doubling of tactile stimuli may occur only if
a conflict occurs between egocentric (body-based) and allocen-
tric (world centered) coordinate frames like for example in the
Aristotle’s diploaesthesia. Indeed, one object touching the con-
tact area between the crossed index and middle fingers is per-
ceived as two objects localized on the lateral surface of each
finger (Bufalari et al., 2014). Striking contradictions occur also
during dreaming (Hobson, 1989, 1999), suggesting an analogy
between this state of consciousness and the above illusions. All
these states may be of fundamental importance for understand-
ing the problem of consciousness (Metzinger, 2009; Revonsuo,
2010).
Human consciousness can be analyzed according to differ-
ent levels, the most significant of which are the phenomenologi-
cal, the neurological and the neurophysiological ones (Revonsuo,
2006). Each level possesses specific properties and rules. Impor-
tantly, the lower levels influence the higher levels and vice-versa
(Revonsuo, 2006; Graziano and Kastner, 2011; Graziano, 2013),
reflecting the bottom-up ontogenetic/epigenetic development of
mind. We acknowledge, however, that different epistemologi-
cal perspectives suggest different models ranging from hierar-
chical (Craver and Darden, 2001; Neisser, 2012), to relatively
independent ones (Ayala and Arp, 2010).
Phenomenological Level
In addition to the classical third-person-perspective analysis
(3PP: a perspective in which the whole universe is given as
existent independently from the observer) it is necessary to
envisage a first person perspective (1PP: in this perspective the
objects in space are necessarily related to an agent) (Revon-
suo, 2006, 2010). At this level, consciousness is an immediate,
undeniable fact of experience, i.e., a “world-for-me” and, more
in general “a-world-for-someone,” which comes in two general
types—interoceptive (from body) and even more within brain
experiences (e.g., homeostatic states such as hunger and thirst
and affective/emotional/mood states) and the more explicit exte-
roceptively driven sensory-driven experiences (e.g., perceptions).
Since the phenomenal world is perceived as “present-for-me,”
it can be considered as composed by a phenomenal space and
by a self, which is the basis for building an egocentric frame of
reference. The ego-center is single and metaphorically located
behind the bridge of the nose, inside our head (Merker, 2007),
but more realistically arising from certain within-brain expe-
riences. The objects belonging to the world are located in the
phenomenal dimension characterized by spatial and temporal
attributes (Revonsuo, 2006).
The phenomenal self, as pointed out by William James, pos-
sesses the characteristics of being “partially known and par-
tially knower, partly object and partly subject” (James, 1892/1948,
p. 176). Already at the phenomenological level, the self does not
seem to be an object, rather a within-brain process, a continuous
stream of experiences and thoughts. The self seems to disappear
during deep slow-wave sleep, and sometimes to dissolve or have
less defined boundaries, also during dreaming (Revonsuo, 2005).
Tellingly, the self reappears with greater perceptual depth and
clarity when we wake up, as already noticed by the Heraclitus
more than 25 centuries ago (Haxton and Hillman, 2001). The self
seems to consist of at least two components, probably arranged in
layers. The first, called the “observer” and corresponding to what
James defined the “I” (James, 1890/1950), is only scarcely investi-
gated by the western psychology that historically did not provide
enough attention to introspection. An exception to this neglect
may come from psychoanalysis that made serious attempts to
distinguish between the Ego and the Self (Treurniet, 1979). The
“I,” on the other hand, has been deeply considered in the East-
ern world especially in the context of Buddhism (Horney, 1950;
Tsering, 2006). The second component called the “observed” and
corresponding what James defined the “Me,” refers to the con-
tent of the experience (e.g., thoughts, sensations, emotions, and
perceived objects; Tagini and Raffone, 2010).
Disorders of Consciousness in Humans
Human consciousness has been operationalized as mainly
formed by two components, namely arousal (wakefulness or vig-
ilance, with phenomenal contents) and awareness (which implies
higher recognition of those contents). This latter component is
further divided in external awareness concerning the sensorial
analysis of the environment and the internal awareness (or self-
consciousness) concerning the innermental representation of the
self (Demertzi et al., 2013a,b). While arousal is linked to activ-
ity of brain stem neural populations connected both directly or
indirectly with the cerebral cortex, awareness depends on the
functional integrity of cerebral cortex and thalamus. From an
evolutionary perspective, the former is commonly assumed to be
foundational for the latter.
Neuroimaging studies indicate that awareness depends on the
integrity of a large cortical network with medial fronto-parietal
structures dealing with processing of internal states mainly
related to self-consciousness (mind wandering, inner speech,
autobiographical memory recall) and lateral cortical structures
mainly dealing with awareness of the external world (Vanhau-
denhuyse et al., 2011; Giacino et al., 2014). Fundamental clues to
the understanding of structures and mechanisms necessary and
sufficient to the appearance of conscious self and world repre-
sentation come from the analysis of patients in whom cerebral
damage alters different forms of consciousness, like coma, vege-
tative state (VS), and minimally conscious state (MCS) (Laureys
et al., 2004; Demertzi et al., 2013a,b; Owen, 2013).
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Functional imaging studies indicate that medial and poste-
rior cortical regions like the precuneus and the posterior cin-
gulate cortex play a crucial role in human awareness. These
regions, for example, do show high metabolic activity during
aware wakefulness. By contrast they are deactivated in profound
anesthesia, in VS patients and in severely demented patients.
Precuneus and posterior cingulate cortex are also hypoactive
in MSC (Ranganath and Ritchey, 2012; Mashour and Alkire,
2013a,b; Giacino et al., 2014). Relevant to this issue are the recent
studies using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to perturb
the cortex and EEG to record the effects of such perturbation.
These studies demonstrate the importance of cortico-cortical
and cortico-subcortical functional connectivity in human con-
scious awareness. More specifically the perturbation induced by
TMS on EEG in VS patients indicate a severe defect of connec-
tivity that is reminiscent of deep sleep and general anaesthesia
states (Casali et al., 2013; Sarasso et al., 2014). MSC is instead
characterized by complex EEG activity suggesting no alteration
of connectivity. Such complex EEG activity, typically found in
in healthy controls, is also observed in Locked-in patients who
are aware of the self and of the environment in spite of their
severe de-efferentation (Rosanova et al., 2012; Tononi, 2012).
The notion that consciousness is related to an optimal functional
connectivity is in keeping with influential theories of conscious-
ness developed in psychology (e.g., the Global Workspace The-
ory hypothesis, Baars, 1988, 2002) and neurobiology (e.g., the
Dynamic Core Theory, Edelman et al., 2011).
Neuropsychological Alterations of Self
Consciousness
Empirical and philosophical studies suggest that the self, in
human beings, is formed by diverse neuropsychological com-
ponents (Stern, 1985; Gallagher, 2000; Northoff et al., 2006).
Already (James, 1890/1950) in his Principles of Psychology
(Chapter X, “The Consciousness of Self ”) proposed distinc-
tions between a physical self, a mental self, and a spiritual
self. This distinction reappeared in the contemporary neuro-
science debate. Particularly important are the studies of com-
plex human pathologies, e.g., epilepsy, consciousness disorders
and the clinical conditions that generate self-disorders (Feinberg
and Keenan, 2005). Overall the following components of human
self can be defined: (i) the proto-self; (ii) the core self; (iii) the
self-consciousness; (iv) the narrative self.
(i) The “proto-self ” (Damasio, 1999, 2010), can be defined
as the most ancient form of coherent world and self-
representation (Panksepp and Northoff, 2009) and it can be
considered as a primary template that helps organisms to
focus on the fundamental intrinsic aspects (e.g., visceral and
motor) of the self. It can be considered as an organizational
unit providing some kind of foundational coordination
for all sensations (Humphrey, 1992, 2011) and primordial
emotions (Panksepp, 1998a,b; Denton, 2006). Behavioral
studies indicate that human newborns do exhibit a com-
plex affective life as indexed by basic emotions as pain, joy,
disgust, anger and by self-relevant acts like hand-mouth
coordination movements (Stern, 1985; Rochat, 2013). For
example, newborn babies may purposely move their hand
to counteract external forces applied to their wrist with
the clear aim to keep seeing their hand and thus exert
a better control on their own action (Van der Meer and
Lee, 1995). It is also relevant that human neonates exhibit
a higher number of head turns toward tactile stimuli
delivered on their cheek by an examiner (external stim-
ulation) with respect to tactile stimuli delivered on the
cheek by themselves (self-stimulation). This behavioral pat-
tern speaks in favor of the innate ability to discriminate
whether tactile stimuli are delivered by the self vs. others
(Rochat and Hespos, 1997).
(ii) “The “core self ” is constituted by the pre-reflective con-
sciousness of oneself as an immediate, embodied subject
of experience (Damasio, 1999, 2010; Parvizi and Dama-
sio, 2001). The core self involves a number of compo-
nents, including the sense of ownership (i.e., the feeling
the body is mine), and sense of agency (i.e., the feeling I
am the one who caused my movement). These dimensions
are pre-reflective, implicit, or tacit aspects of our experi-
ence (Vogeley and Gallagher, 2013, p. 119). The core self
is connected to semantic memory systems and also to affec-
tive systems (Tulving, 2002a; Northoff and Panksepp, 2008;
Panksepp and Northoff, 2009). Such basic forms of self
and world representations likely operate only in the present
moment (Edelman, 1989; Edelman and Tononi, 2000).
Individuals who possess this form of consciousness show
self-recognition and recognition of objects in the world
(Tulving, 2002b). Many nonhuman animals, especially
mammals and birds, for example, seem to be endowed with
well-developed knowledge-of-the-world (semantic mem-
ory) and to flexibly utilize this information (Tulving, 2002a,
p. 6). Conditioning studies indicate that semantic memory
systems are present in birds. Pigeons for example, can learn
to discriminate images of trees and categorize them accord-
ing to whether they are with or without leaves (Herrnstein,
1979; Herrnstein, 1990) as well as to form the “concept”
of car, chair, human face (Cook and Smith, 2006). Not
only mammals but also several species of fishes, reptiles
and birds can encode the features of the environment in
“map-like memory representation” (Bshary et al., 2002).
Moreover, selective lesions of the teleost lateral pallium (a
structure analogous to the mammalian hippocampus) in
goldfish trained in a variety of spatial memory tasks induce
conspicuous spatial memory deficits (Broglio et al., 2011).
Two important characteristics of the core self are the sense
of ownership (i.e., of owing a body) and the sense of agency
(i.e., of being the actor of one’s own actions).
(iii) “Self-consciousness” has typically been explored in develop-
mental and comparative psychology using mirror recogni-
tion tests that explore how humans or other animals react
to surreptitiously introduced changes (e.g., a blot on their
body) of their image reflected in a mirror. Only at the age
of 18 months children become capable of self-recognizing
themselves in the mirror and to understand that pictures
represent other people. According to Perner (1991) mir-
ror self-recognition implies to own the representation of
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the model of a real self as well as the model of the
reflected-in-a-mirror model. The same test has been used
in several vertebrate species. Although controversies have
arisen about the validity of the mark test, studies suggest
that chimpanzees (after the age of 28 month), orangutans,
macaques, dolphins, elephants and corvid birds may show
evidence of mirror self-exploration. By contrast, animals
like dogs or cats either ignore the reflected image or react to
the image as though they were in front of a rival individual
(Devue and Brédart, 2011;Mashour and Alkire, 2013b). It is
worth noting that the mirror test may not represent defini-
tive evidence for the presence or absence of self-recognition
and spurious variables (like scarce motivation to watch
reflected images)may influence the test (Gallup et al., 2013).
(iv) The narrative self (Gallagher, 2000; Boyd, 2009; Dama-
sio, 2010) refers to the capability of handle episodic-type,
declarative memories that unify the self into a coherent
story. Prerequisites for developing a fully blown narrative
self may include language (Gazzaniga, 2002, 2011; Badde-
ley et al., 2009) and the neuro-psychic device that allows
individuals to mentally travel in time (Wheeler et al., 1997;
Tulving, 2002a,b; Corballis, 2012). Such a device makes
possible not only the aware recall of past events (i.e., auto-
biographical memory) but also to imagine possible future
events including one’s own death (Valentini et al., 2014).
The ability to mental traveling in time seems to be under-
pinned by a variety of neural regions involved in memory
(e.g., the hippocampus) and in the aware perception of the
self (e.g., mid-line prefrontal and parietal regions, Schac-
ter et al., 2007). The capability to mentally travel in time,
an ability linked to the task-unrelated thoughts that charac-
terize mind wandering, probably appeared more than one
million years ago in the genus Homo habilis and is pos-
sibly at the basis of building lithic tools (Corballis, 2012;
Fabbro and Crescentini, 2014). Importantly, the mind may
wander not only in time by also in others’ mind. Related
to this is the development of shared intentionality (joint
intentions and attention) and the ability to know (or the
belief to be able to know) what other individuals think or
believe, the so-called theory ofmind that seems to bemainly
a human feature (Tomasello et al., 2005; Corballis, 2012).
It has been suggested that self-referential cognition, inner
speech, mind wandering and autobiographical memory are
important components of self-awareness a complex func-
tion likely underpinned by medial brain areas (Vanhau-
denhuyse et al., 2011; Demertzi et al., 2013a,b; Campanella
et al., 2014).
Neurophysiological Correlates of Consciousness
One of the most significant discoveries in the contemporary
neurophysiological research has been the correlation between
neural activity of specific neuronal populations and conscious
experience. It has been demonstrated that the conscious recog-
nition of a visual stimulus correlates with synchronized dis-
charge frequencies of neurons around 40Hz (or in the gamma
band: 20–80Hz). In binocular rivalry experiments (Logothetis
and Schall, 1989), for example, the gamma band is correlated
with the activity of the visual areas that are involved in the
processing of the dominant (conscious) stimulus. The same
gamma band activity decreases in neurons that are involved
in the processing of suppressed (non-conscious) stimuli (Engel
and Singer, 2001; Fries, 2009). Moreover, neural activity syn-
chronized around 40Hz has been then correlated with the phe-
nomenal content of visual awareness and has been associated
to the efficiency of cortico-cortical connections and/or to spe-
cific and nonspecific thalamo-cortical loops (Llinás, 2001; Edel-
man, 2004). The gamma band specific neuronal activity seems
associated to the “binding” of the disparate elements that com-
pounds a unitary conscious percept. Interestingly, such activity
has been found also at the subcortical level (e.g., the supe-
rior colliculus or the optic tectum) (Brecht et al., 2001; Merker,
2007).
Neurophysiology may help substantially to understand the
link between states of consciousness and brain activity. Seminal
studies indicate that it takes a long time (about 300–500ms) to
sensory stimuli to reach the threshold of conscious awareness
(Libet et al., 1983; Libet, 2004). Related to the issue of deter-
mining objective indices for measuring consciousness of sensory
stimuli, three main signatures have been hypothesized namely:
(i) an amplification of activation and reverberation within a large
network of distant brain areas (accompanied by a broad compo-
nent of EEG called P300 wave); (ii) a late and distributed burst
of local high-frequency activity (>30Hz); and (iii) a massive
increase in the synchronicity between distant brain areas in the
beta band (13–30Hz) (Dehaene, 2014; Dehaene et al., 2014). In
recent studies combining TMS and EEG, a perturbational com-
plexity index (PCI) has been obtained that measures cortical
connectivity (Casali et al., 2013; Sarasso et al., 2014). PCI dis-
criminated different levels of consciousness not only in healthy
individuals during wakefulness, sleep, and anesthesia, but also
in patients who had emerged from coma and recovered a min-
imal level of consciousness. In particular, inter-cortical connec-
tivity was higher during awake and REM states and lower during
slow-waves sleep, anaesthesia and minimal consciousness states
(Casali et al., 2013).
Neurobiological Correlates of Self and
World Representations: from Humans to
Other Vertebrates
With the aim of developing our general argument, here we posit
that the human brain is composed of a basal and a forebrain
system (see Figure 1).
The first, hereafter referred to as basal system includes
the spinal cord, the brainstem, the cerebellum, the hypotha-
lamus, the central thalamic nuclei and the oldest portions
of the telencephalon (Sarnat and Netsky, 1981; Nieuwenhuys
et al., 1998; Northcutt, 2002; Striedter, 2005). The second,
referred to as forebrain system, includes the evolutionarily
most recent parts of the thalamus, basal ganglia and the cere-
bral cortex, which according to the widely known model pro-
posed by MacLean (1990) corresponds to the triune brain
(reptilian, paleomammalian, and neomammalian). Although
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FIGURE 1 | Artistic representation of the basal and forebrain
regions in the vertebrates (Image credits to Massimo
Bergamasco). Lateral view (Left panel) and mid-sagittal view (right
panel) of the brain of: (A) rainbow trout, Salmo gairdneri; (B) green
frog, Rana esculenta; (C) tegu lizard, Tupinambis teguixin; (D) pigeon,
Columba livia; (E) cat; and (F) human brain. For each vertebrate brain,
the basal subcortical regions is highlighted (in orange) in the mid-sagittal
views.
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very fortunate, the triune brain model ignores the fish brain
that is instead considered in our two-systems proposal. Indeed,
while the forebrain system is developed in the vertebrate ter-
restrial animals (although with various degrees of complexity
in amphibians, reptiles, birds, and mammals), only the basal
subcortical system is well developed in fishes. Here we posit
that a form of primary consciousness is already present in the
animals with a nervous system composed mainly by the basal
subcortical system (e.g., in fishes, Damasio, 1999, 2010; Chan-
droo et al., 2004; Merker, 2007; Ward, 2011). Interestingly, the
reappearance of consciousness in people emerging from gen-
eral anesthesia is related to activity of brainstem and dien-
cephalic structures (Långsjö et al., 2012; Mashour and Alkire,
2013a).
Studies indicate that basal subcortical structures play an
important role in the representation of self and world (see for
example, Panksepp, 1998a; Merker, 2007; Damasio, 2010). As
mentioned above, subcortical circuitry has already reached a
strong development in fishes and is present in all the other
classes of vertebrates. One main function of those brain regions
is to coordinate and control both the cephalic segment and
the remaining parts of the body, with a variety of brainstem
structures including some of the most ancient, centromedial
regions like the periaqueductal gray (Bailey and Davis, 1942;
Panksepp, 1998a,b) that contribute to this task. Three other mid-
brain and brainstem structures seem to play a critical role for
the development of primary forms of consciousness namely:
(i) the hypothalamus, which is primarily involved in monitor-
ing body homeostatic (e.g., hunger, thirst, and thermoregula-
tion) and emotional states, and in regulating and integrating
primary motivational states related to goal directed behaviors;
(ii) central thalamic nuclei, particularly the thalamic reticular
nucleus, that are thought to be involved in maintaining pri-
mary conscious awareness (Ward, 2011); (iii) the roof of the
midbrain (superior colliculus or optic tectum), which repre-
sents a multisensory integration station where representations
(simulations) of a “distal world” are generated; and as already
noted (iv) the periaqueductal gray (PAG) a structure of funda-
mental importance for the emotional-motor integration that has
recently received abundant attention (Parvizi andDamasio, 2001;
Merker, 2007, 2013; Panksepp and Northoff, 2009; Damasio,
2010).
The roof of the mesencephalon of vertebrates (optic tectum),
together with the hypothalamus (located in the floor of the dien-
cephalon), forms the mesodiencephalon, a structure with major
integrative functions present in all vertebrates. It has to be noted
that superior colliculus (and/or the optic tectum) has a spe-
cial role in controlling eye movements that are probably the
most complex movements present in fishes (Stein et al., 2002a,b).
The PAG is a complex mesencephalic structure that surrounds
the cerebral aqueduct, is intimately related to the deeper col-
licular layers, and is part of the emotional motor system. In
mammals it receives more than half of the ascendent fibers
related to pain perception (Parvizi and Damasio, 2001; Dama-
sio, 2010), and is strongly connected with important structures
of the basal subcortical system (hypothalamus, amygdala, raphe
nuclei, and superior colliculus) as well as with structures of
the forebrain group (insula and cingulate cortex; Vianna and
Brandão, 2003). The PAG is probably one of the most ancient
structures devoted to emotional integration, it coordinates an
exceptional variety of emotion-related behaviors such as defen-
sive, aggressive, reproductive, vocal, and pain-related ones, from
fishes to human beings (Lovick and Adamec, 2009). The impor-
tance of PAG in emotional integration is particularly evident
from the analysis of the very rare patients with global selective
PAG lesions, comparable to the cats and monkeys studied by
Bailey and Davis (1942). Patient GM, for example, although not
affected by primarily motor disturbances, remained immobile for
hours, completely dumb and lacking any motor initiative. This
behavior was also in contrast with the patient’s ability to under-
stand complex phrases and execute complex orders (Esposito
et al., 1999).
Anatomic, physiological and behavioral evidence suggests
that the basal subcortical system may underpin a primary self-
representation. Such a system, which is present in all vertebrates,
is made of neural circuits based on reciprocal connections
between brain stem and central thalamic nuclei with phylo-
genetic old cortices (Meek and Nieuwenhuys, 1998; Mueller,
2012). These connections may allow for the type of re-entrant
interactions that, according to Edelman, are at the base of pri-
mary consciousness (Edelman, 1992, 2004; Edelman and Tononi,
2000). Neurophysiologic studies indicate that brainstem struc-
tures are endowed with a neural machinery adept to perform
multimodal integration of sensory stimuli and create multisen-
sory representations of the self and the body (Herrero et al.,
1998; Sparks, 2002; Luque et al., 2005) and allow organisms to
integrate world- (target selection), body- (action selection), and
motivation- (needs) cues so as to optimize decisional processes
(Merker, 2007; Broglio et al., 2011). Moreover, the superior col-
liculus is the only structure outside the cerebral cortex where fast
oscillations in the gamma range associated to the conscious per-
ception of stimuli have been recorded (Brecht et al., 2001; Engel
and Singer, 2001; Fries, 2009). Behavioral studies indicate that
in teleost fishes lesions of the tectum but not of hippocampal
pallium, impair the use of egocentric strategies for spatial orien-
tation and generates a profound disorganization of exploratory
patterns (Salas et al., 2003; Burnett et al., 2004). Clinical stud-
ies indicate that anencephalic humans can exhibit minimal states
of consciousness as indexed by affective interactions with other
individuals and absence seizures (Shewmon et al., 1999; Merker,
2007).
The nervous system structures that we assign to the basal
subcortical group seem to be capable of generating a somewhat
rudimentary representation of the world and of the self in mobile
animals. In particular, the superior colliculus and the periacque-
ductal gray may be involved in the creation of an ego-centered,
primary consciousness that is crucial for generating a represen-
tation of the world (Stein et al., 2002b; Panksepp and Northoff,
2009; Damasio, 2010). It is from the interaction between subject-
centered perspectives and objects that a conscious mind can
appear (Damasio, 1999, 2010; Revonsuo, 2006). More specifi-
cally any conscious state implies the presence of a subject (“x”) in
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relationship with an object (“y”) situated in a specific space (“z”)
(Merker, 2007, 2013); and for human beings also the variable
time (“t”) seems to be relevant. However, there is a possibility
that time is completely a construction of the brain to code for
changes in the world rather than being a entity that exists in
the world. For instance, schools of physics have emerged sug-
gesting the universe itself may be timeless (Barbour, 2000). That
self and world representations are linked to the basal subcorti-
cal group was posited by the famous neurosurgeon Wilder Pen-
field who thought that studying the cortical cerebral effects of
epilepsy could provide a unique opportunity to study the neu-
ronal substratum of consciousness (Penfield and Jasper, 1954,
p. 480; Penfield, 1975). Although not widely enough recognized
in consciousness studies, it is now eminently clear that affec-
tive consciousness is a property of subcortical circuits we share
with the other animals (Panksepp, 1998a; Solms and Panksepp,
2012).
Evolution and Organization of the Nervous
System in Vertebrates
All vertebrates derive from elongate worms with flat or cylin-
drical bodies (protochordates) living in fresh water, like the pla-
narians, with a primitive circulatory system and the enteric tract
opened at both ends (Sarnat and Netsky, 1985, 2002; Nieuwen-
huys et al., 1998). Vertebrates are divided in jawless vertebrates
(agnates) and jawed vertebrates (gnathosomes). The earliest ver-
tebrates, namely the jawless fish, appeared soon after the Cam-
brian period, about 470 million years ago (the corresponding
actual forms are Hagfishes and Lampreys). The first amphib-
ians (ancestors of the present frogs, toads, newts, and salaman-
ders) left water around 370 million years ago. The terrestrial life
required the development of a respiratory system and limbs to
permit survival and active movements. Around 300 million years
ago the first reptiles appeared. They were able to move with larger
efficiency on dry land. They laid eggs on dry land and developed
copulatory organs allowing internal fertilization. Soon after their
origin, reptiles divided into three separate lineages: the synap-
sidis, that diversified into mammals, the anaspides the ancestors
of present-day turtles, and the diaspides that led to dinosaurs,
birds as well as to other living reptiles (crocodilians, lizards, and
snakes). Both birds and mammals have developed thermoregu-
lation. In these classes a substantial amount of energy is utilized
to maintain stable body temperature. This fact had other major
consequences, for instance the need for infant birds and mam-
mals to be cared for a long time after birth, a phenomenon that
likely fostered social-bonding, mechanisms of early socialization
and various learned behaviors. The first mammals developed dur-
ing the same general time period when dinosaurs reached their
evolutionary peak (around 220 million years ago), but they gen-
erally occupied nocturnal niches. For this reason mammals may
have developed an efficient ability to move in the dark using
sense of smell and a representation of space based on the sense of
hearing (Jerison, 1973). The augmented hearing abilities of mam-
mals allowed them to develop specific forms of communication
between babies and their mother (Allman, 2000).
World and Self Representations in the Main
Classes of Vertebrates
Although our ultimate aim is to define what is unique to
human consciousness—(encapsulated by Endel Tulving’s con-
cept of autonoetic consciousness), we discuss in the following
evolutionary perspectives about the existence of consciousness
in other creatures. Although this has long been a contentious
topic, we accept that consciousness comes in various forms rang-
ing from affective value-encoding varieties (see Panksepp, 1998a)
to a diversity of cognitive instances. Moreover, consciousness has
an evolutionary history. Thus, the experiences of other animals
deserve the respect and understanding that has not consistently
been part of the scientific conversation. Thus, although briefly,
we highlight here a variety of key issues.
Several studies attempted to define stringent criteria for
exploring consciousness in non-human animals (Edelman et al.,
2005; Seth et al., 2005; Edelman and Seth, 2009; Boly et al., 2013).
Given the absence of language in non-human species, informa-
tion about their ability to represent the self and the world cannot
be obtained as explicit reports concerning the introspective, first-
person perspective. However, the following anatomic and phys-
iologic evidence hints at the presence of primary consciousness
in non-human animals: (i) a pattern of EEG activity in the range
of 20–70Hz, typically associated to wakefulness and REM sleep
(Revonsuo, 2010); (ii) thalamo-cortical activity (Edelman et al.,
2011); (iii) widespread brain activation during processing of sen-
sorial stimuli (Baars, 2002; Tononi, 2012); (iv) selective synchro-
nization at cortical and brainstem levels of dynamically formed
neural networks involved in binding sensory stimuli (Brecht
et al., 2001; Crick and Koch, 2003); (v) presence of egocentric
maps for localizing an individual in a given space. Although
mainly found in the parietal lobe, egocentric, proto-self related
maps are also found in the limbic region, the hypothalamus, and
even in the PAG and in the mesencephalon (Parvizi and Dama-
sio, 2001; Damasio, 2010). Indeed, if one considers affective states
to be part of phenomenal consciousness, then it is noteworth that
such systems are concentrated in subcortical regions of the brain
(Panksepp, 1998a; Solms and Panksepp, 2012). It is worth not-
ing that invertebrates, such as crayfish, also exhibit conditioned
place preferences for drugs like amphetamine, cocaine, and mor-
phine that are highly addictive in humans. This is consistent with
the thesis that even some invertebrates may have affective expe-
riences (see Huber et al., 2011). However, here we will largely
consider evidence for vertebrates, with a focus on cognitive rather
than affective forms of consciousness, which may go even further
back in brain evolution.
Fishes
Fishes are the largest class of vertebrates with more than 32,000
species. Most of the available knowledge about fishes comes
from the study of Teleosts in which the nervous system is
organized similarly to the other main classes of vertebrates. In
particular, the brain of all vertebrates shares the main classes
of neurotransmitters and neuromodulators and the topograph-
ical organization (with spinal cord, the rhomboencephalon—
medulla oblongata, pons and cerebellum-, the mesencephalon,
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and the prosencephalon—diecephalon and telencephalon (Meek
and Nieuwenhuys, 1998; Mueller, 2012).
In several species of Teleosts the most developed sensory
organ is the eye. Around five hundred thousand fibers of the
optical nerve reach the optic tectum (a retinotopically-organized
structure composed of seven main layers) that integrates visual,
auditory and tactile information in order to build up a body-
centered representation of the environment. Moreover, the optic
tectum coordinates the oculomotor circuit that is the most com-
plex motor system present in fishes. Indeed, fish that exhibit
the best discriminatory behaviors show the most developed
“voluntary” eye movements, including, in some cases, individual
fixation movements of the two eyes (Trevarthen, 1968, p. 89;
Sagev et al., 2007; Martinez-Conde and Macknik, 2008). More-
over, neuropsychological deficits in allocentric (i.e., world-based)
visual coordinates but not in ego-centric (i.e., self-based) motor
coordinates have been observed in Teleost fishes after lesions
of the telencephalon, while optic tectum lesions brought about
deficits in egocentric, body-centered orientation, an effect also
found in vertebrates (Broglio et al., 2011). It is worth noting
that lesions to the medial telencephalic pallium (a structure
corresponding to the amygdala) in the same species induced
significant disorders in emotional behaviors (aggressive, repro-
ductive, parental behavior, and emotional memories; Chandroo
et al., 2004; Salas et al., 2006). Studies indicate that goldfish
trained to use allocentric procedures based on distal visual
cues can navigate directly to the reward place from previously
unvisited start locations by adopting spontaneously the most
direct routes. The use of appropriate trajectories without a his-
tory of previous training represents evidence for the capacity
of goldfish to represent the environment independently from
a body-centered reference system (Odling-Smee et al., 2012).
Interestingly, allocentric spatial cognition in fish is lost fol-
lowing lesions to the teleost telencephalon. In contrast, body-
centered orientation strategies are impaired following tectal
lesions (Broglio et al., 2011).
Shoaling fishes use odor and visual cues to perform sophis-
ticated discrimination of their preferred shoalmates suggest-
ing individuality can be recognized (Griffiths and Ward, 2012).
Dugatkin and Godin (1992) provide experimental evidence that
female guppies change their preference between two males if
they observed another female being courted by the less-preferred
male. Also, males cichlids (Astatotilapia burtoni) can perform
transitive inference about dominance hierarchy by observing the
interactions of co-specifics with different degrees of dominance
(Grosenick et al., 2007) and deciding to spend more time close to
the weaker male (Bshary, 2012). Thus, several types of fishes have
impressive long termmemories and show complex behaviors that
are reminiscent of the Machiavellian strategies of manipulation
observed in more complex species (Brown et al., 2011). Studies
indicate that fishes have the ability to perform self-discrimination
tasks. The cichlid Pelvicachromis taeniatus, for example, can rec-
ognize its own odor and prefer it’s over the odor of other, either
familiar or unrelated fishes (Thunken et al., 2009). Moreover,
fishes appear able to assess their own status and make behav-
ioral decisions based upon this notion. It is also worth noting that
the behavior of fishes merely watching the fight of conspecifics is
influenced by the victor or loser of the interaction. This suggests
that fishes are able to make third-party assessment relative to
others (Oliveira et al., 1998). Based on the role that specific struc-
tures play in the different forms of consciousness in mammals,
one may hypothesize that Teleost fishes may have a “primary
cognitive consciousness” (a primary representation of the world,
with objects, and the proto-self) and possibly also a “core self ”
(see Table 1; Griffin, 1992; Chandroo et al., 2004; Merker, 2007;
Broglio et al., 2011). What is not clear is whether at least some
Teleost fishes show the eye movements and motor automatisms
that characterize REM sleep in mammals (Nicolau et al., 2000).
Neural systems responsible for normal sleep-waking cycling are
localized in the brain stem while the system related to REM sleep
generation are localized in structures below the ascending reticu-
lar activating system responsible for waking arousal. Thus, while
REM mechanisms may be related to a primitive form of waking
arousal that provides background functions such as the integra-
tion of emotionally information, higher-brain stem structures are
responsible for a more complex form of primary consciousness
(Panksepp, 1998a).
Amphibians
Most of our knowledge about the amphibians’ (frogs, newts, and
salamanders) brain comes from studies of frogs (Ten Donkelaar,
1998a; Llinás and Precht, 2012). These animals do not possess
the fovea, are not able to perform eye movements but use visual
information to capture preys (by catching them with the tongue)
and to recognize potential predators and to escape. On the other
hand, their sexual life is regulated by touch, hearing and vocal-
izations. The studies performed by Lettvin et al. (1959) showed
that frogs are able to see only moving objects. In constrast, stud-
ies by Ingle (1973) described two visual pathways also in frogs:
(i) the first (the tectal system) is involved in prey catching and in
the visually-driven escape from looming targets; (ii) the second
(the pretectal system) is responsible for visual guidance to avoid
barriers and obstacles. The most complex structure processing
visual, auditory and tactile inputs in frogs is the optic tectum
that may be responsible of the representation of the world and
of the proto-self. In particular, Jörg-Peter Ewert studied how frog
and toads use visual information to recognize prey and preda-
tors: a small horizontal stripe (worm configuration) is interpreted
as prey, a vertical stripe (antiworm configuration) is interpreted
TABLE 1 | Representation of the self in the main classes of vertebrates.
Primary self Core self Self-consciousness Narrative self
Teleost fishes + (?) − −
Anphibians + (?) − −
Reptiles + + − −
Birds + + +* −
Mammals + + +** −
Homo sapiens + + + +
*European Magpie (Pica Pica).
**Chimpanzee, Orangutan, Dolphin, Elephant.
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as a potential predator (Wachowitz and Ewert, 1996; Ewert,
1997). Amphibians show procedural learning phenomena (habit
learning) but they do not seem to show emotional responses
to stress (emotional fever and emotional tachycardia; Cabanac
and Cabanac, 2004). For this reason it is held that amphibians
do not show emotional responses to fear and pleasure (Cabanac
et al., 2009). Yet, the organization of the amphibians nervous
system, with a highly developed optic tectum and the presence
of telencephalon components associated to the representation
of emotions do suggest that a primary consciousness may be
present in amphibians (Table 1), and as already noted, an affec-
tive form of consciousness is evident even among invertebrates
when drug-reward is used as a criterion (Huber et al., 2011).
Reptiles
The four orders of reptiles (turtles, Chelonia; tuatare, Ryncho-
cephalia; lizards and snakes, Squamata; alligators and crocodiles,
Crocodilia) together with birds and mammals, form the group of
amniotes that completes their reproductive cycle outside water.
The brains of reptiles generally have about double the volume
as compared to amphibians, even after taking into account their
body weight. Among the structures that are mainly responsi-
ble for the brain volume increase are the tectum of mensen-
cephalon, the cerebellum and the forebrain. In diurnal reptiles the
optic tectum is a structure devoted to sensory-motor integration
(visual, auditory, tactile, and proprioceptive), heavily connected
with the thalamus and the telencephalon. In reptiles, as well as
in fish and amphibians, the tectum generates a body-centered
map of the environment. The increased volume of the reptile’s
cerebellum is linked to the increased importance of the limbs in
locomotion.
The reptile’s telencephalon consists of the olfactory bulbs and
the cerebral hemispheres. Each of the cerebral hemispheres con-
tain the pallium, the striatum and the septum. The cerebral
cortex of reptiles is multilayered and receives ascending pro-
jections from thalamic nuclei. One of the most significant dif-
ference between the brain of amphibians and that of reptiles is
the development of a large telencephalic intraventricular protru-
sion: the Dorsal Ventricular Ridge (DVR). The anterior part of
DVR is the telencephalon locus devoted to sensory (somatosen-
sory, gustatory, visual, acoustic) integration and it has analogies
with the mammalian neocortex. The posterior dorsal ventricular
ridge (PDVR) resembles the mammalian amygdala. In reptiles
the major output center of the telencephalon—the striatum—
resembles the basal ganglia in mammals (Ten Donkelaar,
1998b). The existence of map-like memory representations of
the environmental space and their damage following lesions
to the medial cortex has been demonstrated in reptiles
(Rodríguez et al., 2002).
Reptiles do exhibit “taste aversion learning” phenomena.
For example, presentation of a new food associated to intra-
peritoneal injections of lithium hydrochloride (a substance that
produces nausea) induces long-lasting avoidance of that food not
only in mammals and birds but also in reptiles suggesting that
they can experience displeasure and pleasure. Similarly, physio-
logical responses like tachycardia and fewer induced by handling
can be seen in mammals and birds but also in reptiles (Cabanac,
1996, 2009; Cabanac et al., 2009). As to higher-order functions,
observational learning has been found in reptiles (Pogona vit-
ticeps) that proved able to open a door to obtain food reward
by simply seeing a co-specifics doing the task (Kis et al., 2015).
It is also worth noting that some species of reptiles (chameleon
lizard, Ctenosaura pectinata), exhibit physiological indices of
REM sleep which suggests the presence of some forms of primary
consciousness (Siegel, 1999, 2008).
Birds
Modern birds include more than 20 orders and display a great
diversity of adaptation to different ecological niches. Birds pos-
sess a highly developed telencephalon. The cerebralization index
(weight of the cortex/weight of the brain stem) is highest in
passeriform birds (particularly in corvids) and lowest in Galli-
naceae. The most developed exteroceptive sense in birds is sight.
For this reason birds have very well developed tectum mesen-
cephalic tissue—brain regions devoted to multisensory integra-
tion allowing them to build complex spatial maps of the world.
The avian diencephalon is well differentiated and densely con-
nected with the telencephalon. In particular the ventral thala-
mus is a relay station for visual, auditory and somatosensory
information.
In birds, the telencephalon is also particularly well developed,
including the paleostriatal complex and regions deriving from
the DVR (neostriatum, hyperstriatum ventral, and archistriatum;
structures that are homologos to the mammalian neocortex). The
paleostriatal complex forms the basal part of the hemisphere and
corresponds to the mammalian corpus striatum (nucleus cauda-
tus, putamen, globus pallidus). The neostriatum is located above
the paleostriatal complex and extends to the frontal, interme-
diate and caudal portions of each hemisphere. The neostriatum
consists of two main regions namely: (i) the nucleus basalis that
receives auditory information and somatosensory information
coming from oral regions; (ii) the ectostriatum, that receives
mainly visual information. The ventral hyperstriatum (HVC) is
located on the top of the neostriatum to which is heavily con-
nected, and is involved in visuomotor activity and learning. The
archistriatum is located in the parieto-occipital pole of the hemi-
sphere and receives afferent information from the neostriatum,
the ventral hyperstriatum and the contralateral archistriatum.
The archistriatum intervenes in the control of premotor and
motor regions of the brain stem.
In songbirds the nucleus robustus, a structure of the archistria-
tum, projects directly to the nuclei involved in vocalization and
respiration (the nucleus robustus together with the HVC form
the “telencephalic pathway of learned song”; Nottebohm, 1993).
The amygdaloid parts of the achistriatum are involved in vari-
ous emotional regulations of behavior as in mammals, including
aggression, fear, and sexuality. The telencephalon of birds con-
sists of: (i) the dorsal eminentia sagittalis, a multilayered struc-
ture, involved in vision and resembling, in terms of organization,
the mammalian lateral geniculate; (ii) hippocampus and area
parahippocampalis, two structures involved in spatial memory
and cognition (Dubbeldam, 1998).
Birds possess extraordinary learning, emotional, and cog-
nitive capabilities (Vallortigara, 2000; Edelman et al., 2005).
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Birds, like mammals, have well-developed slow wave sleep and
rapid eye movement sleep (Nicolau et al., 2000). The pres-
ence of REM sleep is probably associated to the ability to
dream and to the presence of phenomenal consciousness (But-
ler and Cotterill, 2006; Revonsuo, 2006, 2010). From a perceptual
point of view, chickens (Gallus Gallus forma domestica) are
able to detect contours, to perform amodal completion tasks,
to recognize Kaniza triangles and to perceive depth (Vallor-
tigara, 2005). Ash-gray parrots (Psittacus erithacus) are able
to label objects, to learn to generalize and to learn concepts
(Pepperberg, 1999, 2008; Pepperberg and Lynn, 2000). Finally,
the ability for mirror self-recognition seems to be present in
corvids (European Magpie, Pica Pica) (Prior et al., 2008; cf.
Table 1).
Mammals
Mammals derive from a group of reptiles (terapsids) that prob-
ably adapted themselves to live in nocturnal niches. Among the
distinguishing characteristics present in all mammals are: (i) the
control of temperature (endothermy); (ii) the bringing up and
care of the offspring; (iii) the vocal communication between
the progeny and the mother; (iv) the development of the telen-
cephalon, with the neocortex able to potentiate analytic, associa-
tive and synthetic abilities. Although the general structure of the
central nervous system is similar in all mammals, relevant differ-
ences in the expansion of the cerebral cortex are found (Voogd
et al., 1998).
The most primitive living mammals (e.g., the opossum)
are omnivorous, live in nocturnal niches and primarily exploit
the senses of smell and hearing for orienting in the world.
Carnivorous are in general nocturnal predators that have devel-
oped acoustic and visual senses in addition to smell. Pri-
mates are diurnal omnivore and live on trees, have strongly
developed vision, high manual dexterity and advanced social
habits. All mammals are endowed with well-developed thalamo-
cortical, cortico-striatal and cortical-pontine-cerebellal circuits
(Seth et al., 2005). Direct cortico-motoneuronal connections that
allow the execution of precise movements are highly developed
in primates.
According to Jerison (1973), mammals appeared more than
200 millions year ago by occupying nocturnal niches free from
reptiles. Mammals exhibit thermoregulation (endodermia), and
have evolved the capacity to retain eggs internally, giving com-
monly to immature (altricial) offspring, except for prey species
that are born precocious, ready to move soon after birth along-
side mothers. In both cases, progeny are born cognitively imma-
ture, requiring prolonged maternal care. A fundamental aspect
of adaptation to nocturnal niches of the earliest mammals was
that their perceptual apparatus could not be based mainly on
vision but had to be “re-represented” using the olfactory and
auditory systems. In mammals, hearing was coordinated with
vision as senses specialized for distance detection. However, the
processing of auditory stimuli for the creation of spatial maps
could not be developed at the peripheral level (due to the con-
straints of the auditory channels) but was moved to more central
loci, involving several structures at both brainstem and cortical
levels.
Primates, by adapting to the life on trees, have developed a
second visual system which is heavily cortical (although closely
coordinated with the older retino-optic tectal system; Goodale
and Milner, 2004). The development of the cerebral cortex is
probably responsible for a diversity of higher mental abilities that
emerge developmentally, largely by learning, in mammals. The
widespread presence of REM sleep is an indicator of the existence
of varieties of dream-consciousness in mammals (Revonsuo,
2006, 2010). Since dream-consciousness is expressed at highest
levels during the weeks and months following birth, the sugges-
tion is made that it may serve to refine critical developmental
functions. It is also noteworthy that mirror self-recognition has
been demonstrated in diverse mammalian species (Vallortigara,
2000; Tannenbaum, 2009; Devue and Brédart, 2011; cf. Table 1).
From both neuroanatomical and neurophysiological
perspectives, human beings have the most complex central
nervous system with a very high brain-body scaling (brain
weight vs. body weight) index. What is greatly increased in the
human cerebral cortex is the number of inter-areal connections
which is 2.75 times with respect to chimps, with number of
neurons being only 1.25 higher (Deacon, 1990). Moreover, the
human brain exhibits an extraordinary development of the
prefrontal lobes and of a direct cortico-spinal bundle that allows
the execution of fine movements of eye and hand muscles as well
as of the vocal articulatory system (Jerison, 1973; Voogd et al.,
1998; Striedter, 2005). Although the higher-order brain regions
alone may not have the intrinsic ability to sustain consciousness
(Solms and Panksepp, 2012) it is clear that the mental abilities
that emerge from neocortical dynamics distinguish us as the
most cognitively complex species in the world, but certainly not
the only one that has consciousness.
What is like to be a Human?
It has long been held that language is what makes humans unique
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Pinker, 1994; Hauser et al., 2002).
However, here we contend that at least two additional impor-
tant abilities are at the very root of being humans. The first is
development of theory of mind and the second the ability tomen-
tally travel in time that has been considered a most sophisticated
form of auto-noetic consciousness. Of course, we cannot exclude
such possibilities in other animals, for detection of such abilities
is critically dependent on complex language abilities. Although it
is certainly possible that other animals may visually or even with
other senses, imagine future possibilities, only humans seem to be
able to conceive their death (Humphrey, 2011; Berlucchi, 2014;
Corballis, 2014).
In any event, the evolutionary pressure to develop increas-
ingly complex brains seemsmaximal at the transition fromHomo
habilis toHomo sapiens, possibly promoted by the adaptive value
of an ever increasing complexity of social interactions. Indeed, to
maximize survival in diverse environments and among diverse
predatory animals, it is fundamentally important to understand
the thoughts, intentions and plans of others, an ability that is
encapsulated in the concept of “theory of mind,” i.e., the ability
to detect and respond to the mental states of others (Goldsmith
and Zimmerman, 2001; Baron-Cohen, 2011; Corballis, 2012).
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Several vertebrates are able to represent spatial aspects of the
world and the self as well as to represent time. However, human
beings may be the only ones who developed sophisticated men-
tal capacities for representing how one’s existence is related to
the thoughts and behaviors of others, in both space and time.
The aspects of consciousness which allowed humans to develop
the cognitive/affective dynamics of social interactions to be inter-
nalized within brain/mind experiential spaces, might parallel the
massive expansion of the cerebral cortex and of the connectivity
across different cerebral areas. Although the capacity for phe-
nomenal consciousness is strongly represented already in the
subcortical neural circuits we share with other animals, our vast
cortical networks allow us to develop the most complex mental
attitudes both toward others and the world.
These higher-order aspects of cortical functions are strongly
allows humans to encode in social and environmental
complexities the highly sophisticated temporal character-
istics, that allow to develop mental landscapes that permit
strategizing above and beyond the capacities of any other species.
Indeed, humans may be the only ones who are not only aware
that they live in the present moment but also along subjectively
experienced time lines of the past and future. Such complex
awareness of material and social worlds is inherently linked
to our “autonoetic consciousness,” and allows human beings
to mentally represent and become aware of their protracted
existence in time and space (Wheeler et al., 1997). Thanks to this
ability humans may not only reconstruct events of their past but
imagine various possible futures.
In the mid 80s Endel Tulving described an amnesic patient
(K.C.) who was no longer able to memorize and remember
events of his past and, more relevant here, to imagine his future.
The loss of the subjective experience of time (autonoetic con-
sciousness, self-knowing), in spite of preserved semantic mem-
ory (noetic consciousness), brought KC to live in a permanent
present with no subjective sense of time but completely spared
cognitive knowledge about physical time, its units, its struc-
ture, and its measurement by clocks and calendars. Using Tul-
ving’s (2002b, p. 317) words, the patient exhibited “a dissociation
between knowing time and experiencing time, a dissociation that
parallels the one between knowing the facts of the world and
remembering past experiences.” Subsequent neuroimaging stud-
ies showed that the cerebral structures that processed the remem-
bering of the past and imaging of the future (mental time travel)
largely overlap and include: (i) medial prefrontal regions; (ii)
medial (precuneus) and lateral parietal cortex; (iii) medial tem-
poral lobe; and (iv) lateral temporal lobe (Schacter et al., 2007).
To mentally travel in time it is necessary to develop: (i) a sense
of subjective time; (ii) the ability to be aware of subjective time
(autonoesis). Moreover, a traveler has to be a “special self ” able
to imagine its existence in time (Tulving, 2002a). Mental time-
traveling abilities are not present in toddlers and start to develop
only 6 months, after the ability for mirror self-recognition has
emerged. Only around 23months, toddlers start to utilize tempo-
ral markers for the past and are able to foresee future activities on
the basis of past experiences (Howe et al., 2003). Thus, autonoetic
consciousness, that may be well-developed around age 3, appears
necessary although not sufficient for the development of episodic
memory (Wheeler et al., 1997; Buckner and Carroll, 2007).
At any rate, the awareness of self in time constitutes the typical
existential dimension of life that ultimately allows human beings
to become aware that death is unavoidable (Heidegger, 1972; Fab-
bro and Crescentini, 2014). Although some capacity for episodic,
self-referential memories has been demonstrated in other species,
such as certain species of birds (Clayton et al., 2003), the mental
dimension of mortality, and all that implies, does not seem to be
present in any other living species (Suddendorf and Busby, 2003)
and it might have been crucial for human cultural evolution (Tul-
ving, 2002b). The construction and conservation of tools (lithic)
may be possible only in the light of their possible future utiliza-
tion (Fabbro and Tomasino, 2012; Fabbro and Crescentini, 2014).
Moreover, verbal structures indicating past and future cannot
develop without a subjective awareness of time. In conclusion,
the narrative self, one of the most advanced forms of conscious
representation of the self and of the world, can probably develop
only in individuals who have developed a subjective conscious-
ness of time and a sufficient capacity for symbolic/verbal com-
munication. Therefore, mental time traveling may also have to do
with developing unique skills that distinguish human beings from
other animal species like the linguistic and technological skills
underlying human cultures (Corballis, 2002, 2012; Lieberman,
2006).
Conclusions
All vertebrates are probably sensory-phenomenally and affec-
tively conscious, as controlled by circadian cycles and various
states of being. Dynamic transitions across different states of con-
sciousness (e.g., from slow-wave sleep to wakefulness) are found
in all vertebrates. Crucially, the range of transitions is maximal in
humans in whom behavioral and neural changes linked to sleep,
dreaming, lucid dreaming, hypnotic trance, out-of-body expe-
riences, assumption of substances are described (Fabbro, 2010;
Baars, 2013). Interestingly, dance and music, that are used in
numerous cultures within medical and religious contexts, favor
the transition from ordinary to altered states of consciousness
(for overviews, see Maloch and Trevarthen, 2009). Thus, in addi-
tion to language, theory of mind and mental time traveling, the
varieties of higher-order states of consciousness (Lewis-Williams
and Clottes, 1998; Lewis-Williams, 2002)may have driven culture
and ultimately made humans unique.
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